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GIVE AND "GET"? APPLYING THE RESTATEMENT OF 
CONTRACTS TO DETERMINE THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 
"GET SETTLEMENT" CONTRACTS. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Abraham has physically, sexually, emotionally, and 
psychologically abused his wife, Sarah, for the length of their 
marriage. Having put up with enough of the abuse, Sarah wants a 
divorce. Abraham says to her: I will grant you a Jewish divorce, but 
only if you sign this contract, which gives me all of our shared 
marital assets; all of our jointly owned business assets; and custody 
of our children. If you do not sign this contract, you will never be 
able to marry or cohabitate with another man. If you do have 
children with another man, those children and their progeny will 
forever be labeled bastards in the Jewish community, only able to 
marry other bastards. While Sarah obviously views the terms of the 
contract as unfair, the distress of Abraham's abuse is too much to 
handle - she signs the contract. As evidenced by a number of cases 
out of New York and New Jersey, 1 such unfair settlement agreements 
are formed all too often. 
Unfortunately, this problem is not a recent one. Tractate Yebamoth 
of the Babylonian Talmud,2 compiled centuries ago, tells the story of 
the niece of one of the great scholars of the Talmudic Era, Rabbi 
Papa.3 The rabbi's niece consented to pay her husband's brother a 
large sum of money to perform the Halitzah4 ceremony, which would 
1. See infra Part N and the cases cited therein. 
2. For a more complete discussion of the Babylonian Talmud and its place in the sphere 
of Jewish law, see Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, 
Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 Mo. L. REv. 312, 314 n.4 (1992) [hereinafter 
Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah]. As Professor Breitowitz does, this author will 
cite to the Babylonian Talmud as "BABYLONIAN TALMUD", with the specific tractate 
and pages following. As Breitowitz notes, "[t]he entire Talmud (without the 
commentaries) has been translated into English and published by the Soncino Press 
under the editorship of Isidore Epstein." Jd (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD (Isidore 
Epstein ed., 1960)). Referencing the Epstein edition may be useful for those not 
proficient in the Hebrew and Aramaic languages. 
3. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE YEBAMOTH 106a. 
4. Literally, "taking off a shoe." See infra note 5. 
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then permit the niece to marry another man. 5 The Beth Din6 in that 
case, and in others involving recalcitrant husbands, cancelled the 
payment aspect of such agreements. 7 Broadly, this Comment will 
address the enforceability of what this author coins "Get8 settlement 
contracts." Such contracts are formed when a husband refuses to 
grant his wife a Get until she agrees to a collateral settlement 
agreement, oftentimes giving the husband a windfall in the divorce 
settlement proceedings. 9 Specifically, this comment will first detail 
the well-documented problem of the Agunah10 and how Get 
settlement contracts arise. This Comment will then compare this 
situation to others implicating religion that secular courts have held to 
be within their purview, to argue that secular courts are not 
constitutionally barred from ruling on the enforceability of Get 
settlement contracts. Next, after discussing the few cases out ofNew 
York and New Jersey dealing with Get settlement contracts, this 
5. According to the Old Testament, when a husband dies childless, the widow must 
either enter into a "Levirite marriage" and marry her husband's brother, or, should the 
brother not want to marry her, he must have the widow perform the Halitzah 
ceremony. See 25 Deuteronomy 5-10 in THE STONE EDITION CHUMASH: THE TORAH, 
HAFT AROS, AND FIVE MEGILLOS WITH A COMMENTARY ANTHOLOGIZED FROM 
RABBINIC WRITINGS, 1063-65 (Nosson Scherman, ed., 11th ed. First Impression, 
Mesorah Publications 2000). The Halitzah ceremony entails the woman "remov[ing] 
his shoe from on his foot and spit[ting] before him .... " Id at 9. Without either 
marrying the brother-in-law or performing Halitzah, a woman in this situation is 
effectively an Agunah, and cannot remarry. See Daniel B. Sinclair, Assisted 
Reproduction in Jewish Law, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 71, 89 (2002). 
6. Literally, "house of justice." A Beth Din is a Jewish rabbinic court. For a historical 
background of Beth Dins, see MICHAEL J. BROYDE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE 
ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH LAW 43--44 (2001) [hereinafter BROYDE, ABANDONED 
WIFE IN JEWISH LAw]; Ginnine Fried, Note, The Collision of Church and State: A 
Primer to Beth Din Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 633, 635-41 (2004). 
7. See Shahar Lifshitz, Distress Exploitation Contracts in the Shadow of No Duty to 
Rescue, 86 N.C. L. REv. 315,339 & n.88, 340 & n.98, 372-73 n.208 (2008). 
8. A "Get" is a Jewish bill of divorce. For a more thorough analysis of a Get, its 
traditional text, and its ramifications, see Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra 
note 2, at 319-21. 
9. See infra Part II. C. 
10. Literally "chained" from the Hebrew word "agun," meaning anchor. Aryeh Cohen, 
Giddul 's Wife and the Power of the Court: On Talmudic Law, Gender, Divorce and 
Exile, 9 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 197, 216 n.73 (2000). There are four 
situations in which a woman may be unable to obtain a Get, and thus, have the status 
of an Agunah: "[T]he husband is mentally ill, thus legally incompetent to grant a 
divorce; the husband has died but there is no legally valid evidence of his death; a 
recalcitrant husband refuses to divorce his wife; or the husband abandons her and 
disappears." BLUMA GOLDSTEIN, ENFORCED MARGINALITY: JEWISH NARRATIVES ON 
ABANDONED WIVES 2 (2007). 
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Comment will apply pertinent sections of the Restatement of 
Contracts to typical Get settlement situations to determine potential 
enforceability issues. Finally, this Comment will then recommend 
another route to unenforceability after a recent decision by the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland. 
II. HOW GET SETTLEMENT CONTRACTS COME ABOUT 
When one has a full understanding of just how unfortunate the 
situation is for Agunot, 11 one can understand how a woman so 
situated would agree to a settlement that could potentially leave her 
financially and otherwise decimated. 
A. Jewish Law and Agunot 
If a man marries a woman and lives with her, and it will be 
that she will not find favor in his eyes, for he found in her a 
matter of immorality, and he wrote her a bill of divorce and 
presented it into her hand, and sent her from his house. 12 
While ancient scholars debated the grounds for which a man may 
pursue a divorce,13 it is clear from the original source of Jewish law, 
the Old Testament, that the choice to initiate the dissolution of a 
marriage rests solely with the man. 14 In fact, until the lOth century, a 
husband could divorce his wife, at his option, for any reason at all, 
with or without her consent. 15 
However, reform in the realm of Jewish marriage and divorce came 
in the lOth century by an Eastern European rabbi by the name of 
Rabbeinu Gershom. 16 Along with forbidding polygamy, 17 Rabbeinu 
ll. Agunot is the plural form of Agunah. 
12. 24 Deuteronomy l in THE STONE EDITION CHUMASH: THE TORAH, HAFTAROS, AND 
FIVE MEGILLOS WITH A COMMENTARY ANTHOLOGIZED FROM RABBINIC WRITINGS, 
1059 (Nosson Scherman, ed., 11th ed. First hnpression, Mesorah Publications 2000). 
13. See IRVING A. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE 
AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 9 (1993) [hereinafter BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CiVIL 
AND RELIGIOUS LAW]. 
14. BROYDE, ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH LAW, supra note 6, at 17. 
15. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE YEBAMOTH, 112b. One opinion in the Talmud 
even permits a husband to divorce his wife for as trivial a matter as burning the soup. 
See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACT ATE GITTJN, 90a. 
16. Literally, "our Rabbi Gershom." 
17. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW, supra note 13, at 10 & n.32. 
However, under the biblical law of the Old Testament, polygamy was not prohibited. 
See, e.g., 16 Genesis 1--4 ("So Sarai ... gave her to Abram her husband, to him as a 
wife."); 26 Genesis 34 ("Esau ... took as a wife Judith daughter ofBeeri the Hittite, 
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Gershom's legislative enactments generally "introduced a spirit of 
equality in divorce proceedings and for the most part necessitate that 
all divorce occur through mutual consent."18 However, despite there 
now being more mutuality in the divorce process than before the 
enactments of Rabbeinu Gershom, a more detailed analysis reveals 
that "a wife is still much more vulnerable than a husband because a 
failure to divorce carries uneven consequences."19 That is, an 
Agunah who chooses to cohabitate or marry another man commits the 
serious biblical prohibition of adultery, and any children stemming 
from such a union are labeled Mamzerim/0 as is the rest of the family 
lineage. 21 Thus, even if the wife wants to tum her back on her 
religious beliefs and cohabitate outside of her marriage, this decision 
not only affects her status in the Jewish community, but the status of 
all future generations stemming from the prohibited relationship. 
Mamzerim are tainted in that they are not free to marry amongst the 
Jewish people; they may only marry other Mamzerim and converts. 22 
In contrast, because polygamy is only prohibited, post-lOth century, 
by merely a rabbinical enactment, a man who has not obtained a 
religious divorce yet chooses to cohabitate outside of his marriage 
has not violated the biblical prohibition against adultery.23 As such, 
any children begot from such a union would not shoulder the burden 
ofbeing labeled Mamzerim. 24 And, even if the wife is not complicit 
in the divorce process, the man still has the option of obtaining a 
Heter Meah Rabbanim/5 making her consent to the divorce 
unnecessary. While Rabbeinu Gershom's enactments protect women 
that want to stay married by providing that they must be complicit in 
divorce proceedings, "it did nothing for the woman who wished to 
and Bashemath daughter of Elon the Hittite .... "); 21 Deuteronomy 15 ("If a man 
will have two wives, one beloved and one hated .... "). 
18. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW, supra note 13, at 11 (alteration in 
original). 
19. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure 
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 781, 811 
(1998) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law]. 
20. Literally, plural of"illegitimate" or "bastard." 
21. Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law, supra note 19, at 811. 
22. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW, supra note 13, at 12 n.35. 
23. Jd. at 12-13 n.38. 
24. Jd. at 12 n.35. 
25. Literally, a '"[d]ispensation of 100 rabbis."' Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, 
supra note 2, at 325. If the husband is able to obtain approval from one-hundred 
rabbis, he is permitted to divorce his wife despite his wife's refusal to accept the Get. 
Jd. However, "as a practical matter, many Rabbinical authorities were extremely 
reluctant to participate in this annulment procedure." I d. 
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marry somebody else and whose husband refused to grant her a 
get."26 
B. The Suffering of Agunot 
Numbers fluctuate greatly as to the exact number of Agunot in the 
United States/7 but in New York, the state with the largest Jewish 
population, 28 estimates have ranged from as few as 50 to as many as 
15,000?9 In response to this menacing problem, the New York State 
Legislature has passed two laws attempting to prevent women from 
becoming Agunot by statutorily providing disincentives to would-be 
recalcitrant husbands.30 However, when one fully understands the 
magnitude of the plight that Agunot face, a number closer to the low 
end of published estimates remains an atrocity. 
26. Jessica Davidson Miller, The History of the Agunah in America: A Clash of Religious 
Law and Social Progress, WOMEN's RTS. L. REP., Falll997, at 3. 
27. The State of Maryland has not been immune to the Agunah problem. See Kelsey 
Volkmann, Orthodox Jew Fights for Her Right to Divorce, BALTIMORE EXAMINER, 
Sept. 18, 2006, http://www.examiner.com/a-293213-0rthodox_Jew_fights_for_her_ 
right_to_divorce.html (detailing the case of a University of Baltimore Law School 
student who refused to give his wife a Get). 
28. See World Jewish Congress: World Jewish Communities, http://www.worldjewish 
congress.org/communities/northamerica/comm_usa.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2009). 
29. See Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 315-16; Cf Jack Nusan 
Porter, Introduction to WOMEN IN CHAINS: A SOURCEBOOK ON THE AGUNAH xi, xiii 
(Jack Nusan Porter ed, 1995) [hereinafter WOMEN IN CHAINS] (explaining why the 
disparity in the figures is so drastic). 
30. A 1983 law provides that one seeking a civil divorce must file an accompanying 
affidavit stating "that he or she has taken ... all steps solely within his or her power to 
remove any barrier to the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce." 
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999). While § 253 has prevented a 
substantial number of women from becoming Agunot, many authors have debated 
both the utility and the constitutionality of the statute. See, e.g., llene H. Barshay, The 
Implications of the Constitution's Religion Clauses on New York Family Law, 40 
How. L.J. 205, 214 (1996); Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 
375-96; Jeremy Glicksman, Almost, but Not Quite: The Failure of New York's Get 
Statute, 44 FAM. CT. REv. 300 (2006); EdwardS. Nadel, New York's Get Laws: A 
Constitutional Analysis, 27 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 55 (1993). The 1992 law 
allows New York courts to consider the withholding of a Get as one of the factors in 
determining the equitable distribution of marital assets. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 
236(B)(5)(h) (McKinney 1999). However, a Beth Din is likely to determine that a Get 
given in response to Section 236 is coerced, and thus, invalid. See generally BROYDE, 
ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH LAW, supra note 6, at 103-17 (explaining the validity of 
Jewish divorces since the 1992 law took effect); BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL AND 
RELIGIOUS LAW, supra note 13, at 212-19 (detailing methods that could be employed 
to avoid a coerced Get); Gedalia Dov Schwartz, Comments on the New York State 
"Get Law," J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'Y, Spring 1994, at 26 (discussing the matter 
of a coerced Get). 
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An Agunah has essentially two options: seek relationships outside 
of her religious marriage,31 tantamount to abandoning the religious 
faith that she has ostensibly adhered to and lived by for decades; or, 
stay committed to her religion, yet lead a life devoid of sexual 
intercourse, affection, and emotional attachment. 32 A woman in this 
predicament is presented with a true "Morton's Fork";33 sacrificing 
either her religious interests or her personal interests. 
Regardless of the sacrifice that an Agunah makes, negative 
psychological effects may result. In the 1950's, Leon Festinger 
conducted a substantial amount of research on the psychological 
construct termed "cognitive dissonance."34 A person experiences 
cognitive dissonance when he or she is "forced to do or say 
something contrary to that [person's] opinion,"35 and the presence of 
cognitive dissonance causes "unpleasant psychological tension. "36 It 
is possible that an Orthodox Jew, of the opinion that the requirement 
of obtaining a Get before entering into other relationships is proper, 
would experience a great deal of cognitive dissonance when choosing 
to ignore that requirement by engaging in extramarital relationships. 
An Agunah in this situation is not merely forced to act in a way that 
is at odds with an opinion; she is being forced to act in a way that is 
at odds with her entire way of life. Thus, from a mental-health 
standpoint, a wife who chooses to sacrifice her religious values by 
leaving the Orthodox way of life may be in a very compromising 
position. 
However, the alternative-staying true to religion by opting to 
refrain from entering into extramarital relationships, yet living a life 
devoid of cohabitation and emotional attachment-may have similar 
negative psychological detriments. In 1943, Abraham Maslow, 
31. See Lucette Lagnado, Of Human Bondage, in WoMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 29, at 9 
('"At some point, I may even go out and try to date .... "'). 
32. See Miller, supra note 26, at 14 ("This means that Jewish women will be left with the 
choice of abandoning their faith or staying chained to a past life .... "). 
33. The term "Morton's Fork" is a choice between two undesirable options, and refers to 
John Morton, "who levied forced loans under Henry VII by arguing the obviously rich 
could afford to pay and the obviously poor were obviously living frugally and thus 
had savings and could pay, too." Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/morton%27s%20fork (last visited Dec. 19, 2008). 
34. See Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced 
Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 203 (1959). 
35. Id. An example of cognitive dissonance would be for a smoker, knowing that 
smoking is unhealthy, to continue engaging in that conduct. See ELLIOT ARONSON, 
THE SOCIAL ANIMAL, 179-83 (Richard C. Atkinson et a!. eds., 7th ed. 1995). 
36. Cognitive Dissonance, http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/stephens/cdback.html (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2008). 
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widely regarded as the father of humanistic psychology,37 published a 
seminal paper in which he conceptualized a "hierarchy of human 
needs."38 According to Maslow's theory, "[h]uman needs arrange 
themselves in hierarchies . . . [and] the appearance of one need 
usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another .... "39 At the base 
of his hierarchy, Maslow lists a number of physiological needs that 
must be met before moving on to higher-level needs. 40 Maslow 
suggests that when such physiological needs are not satisfied, "all 
other needs may become simply non-existent or be pushed into the 
background. "41 One such need, he suggests, is the need to engage in 
sexual behavior42-a component of healthy marriages of which 
Agunot are deprived. Thus, because Agunot are lacking one of 
Maslow's "physiological needs," they will be unable to focus on 
higher-level needs, such as self-esteem, confidence, achievement, and 
gaining the respect of others.43 Furthermore, even if all of their 
physiological needs are met, Agunot are devoid of much of what 
Maslow discusses in the third-level of his hierarchy: "[t]he love 
needs."44 Being technically married to a person who knowingly 
inflicts emotional pain on her, an Agunah will continually "hunger 
for affectionate relations,"45 and will similarly be unable to focus on 
higher-level needs. If Maslow's theory is correct, Agunot, living 
without both the physiological needs and love that all people yearn, 
may lack self-esteem, confidence, achievement, and a sense of 
feeling respected by others.46 As such, a woman refusing to leave the 
Orthodox tradition that she has lived for so long, while perhaps not 
suffering from as much cognitive dissonance, can remain 
compromised from a mental-health standpoint. 
37. DUANE P. SCHULTZ & SYDNEY ELLEN SCHULTZ, A HISTORY OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 
366 (4th ed. 1987). 
38. See A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REv. 370 (1943), 
available at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Maslow/motivation.htm (last visited Dec. 
22, 2008). 
39. !d. 
40. See id. at 370-76. 
41. !d. at 373. 
42. !d. at 374. Also relevant to Agunot, Maslow discusses the desire for sex in the context 
of marriage in the third level of his hierarchy. See id. 380-81. 
43. See id. at 381-82, 389. 
44. !d. at 380-81. 
45. !d. at 381. 
46. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at xiii ("She, devastated and humiliated by 
abandonment, saw herself as incompetent, incapable of 'holding onto a husband,' and 
felt both victimized and ashamed of her victimization."), 4 ("[N]ot to mention the 
shame, social ostracism, and loss of self-esteem and status she would suffer."). 
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However, it should here be noted that this author does not assert 
that every Agunah faces severe psychological effects from the 
realities of her situation. Actually, it is possible that women faced 
with Get settlement contracts may suffer psychologically less than 
other Agunot, as they may be offered, and often accept, their 
settlement contracts in a relatively short span of time. The negative 
effects felt by these women likely come in the form of being forced 
to agree to an unfair divorce settlement, and having to deal with the 
subsequent fallout. Thus, while all Agunot assuredly are in a 
precarious position, the title does not inevitably carry the 
aforementioned negative psychological detriments posited by 
Festinger and Maslow. 
Any negative psychological effects that may exist are exacerbated 
in situations where such psychological torment is accompanied by 
physical abuse. Some wish to deny that domestic violence is a 
problem in the Jewish world;47 they are either in denial or grossly 
misinformed. Studies have approximated the rate of domestic 
violence in Jewish families at fifteen to thirty percent.48 In fact, it has 
been argued that for Orthodox women, for whom the Agunah 
problem is most prevalent,49 escaping from an abusive marriage is 
particularly difficult. 50 Ironically, one author suggests that a fear of 
living as an Agunah is what keeps certain abused women in such 
relationships. 51 While certainly not every Agunah experiences 
physical abuse at the hands of her recalcitrant husband, it has been an 
47. See Beverly Horsburgh, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Domestic Violence in the Jewish 
Community, 18 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 171, 172 (1995) (quoting a rabbi who claimed, 
"[domestic violence] is not Jewish. I don't know any women in my congregation who 
are abused. Why is a nice Jewish woman writing about this?"). 
48. !d. at 178 & n.5. For an example of an empirical study of attitudes toward, and 
experiences with domestic abuse in the Jewish world, see Lydia M. Belzer, Toward 
True Shalom Bayit: Acknowledging Domestic Abuse in the Jewish Community and 
What to Do About It, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 241 (2005). 
49. See Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 361 (explaining how, 
because of a proposed change to the Conservative marriage document, the Agunah 
issue is more easily remedied in Conservative Jewish circles). 
50. See Horsburgh, supra note 47, at 203 ("Imagine the difficulties facing Orthodox 
battered women. First of all, it may be difficult for them to interpret their situation as 
abusive, given their submissive role in life .... They lack money and have restricted 
career options because of their religious practices .... Community mores dictate that 
Orthodox women tum to their rabbis for advice, instead of calling the police, a social 
worker, or a psychologist.") (footnote omitted). 
51. See id. at 194 ("Some battered Jewish women, knowing that only the husband is 
empowered to divorce, view their situation as hopeless."). 
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issue for many, 52 and the existence of such abuse surely compounds 
any emotional or psychological abuse incident to the Agunah 
predicament. 
C. The Inevitable Consequence: Get Settlement Contracts 
While an Agunah may believe she has only two options53-
abandoning her Orthodox faith by seeking extramarital relationships, 
or remaining in the psychologically-damaging marriage-there are 
times that a recalcitrant husband can offer his wife a way out of the 
misery. That is, a husband, knowing the distress that both of the two 
aforementioned options pose, may offer to give his wife a Get for the 
small price of her agreement to a contract. The problem is, however, 
that the price the wife pays in holding up her end of the bargain is 
often not small at all. Such contracts, which this author coins "Get 
settlement contracts," often require fearful wives to pay exorbitant 
amounts of money54 or marital assets, 55 or to relinquish custody of the 
couple's children,56 in exchange for freedom. 57 These contracts, 
which one prominent Orthodox rabbi and law professor calls 
"extortion in its simplest form," 58 involve a gross disparity in 
bargaining power. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the secular courts 
to closely examine the facts and circumstances of each contract and 
its formation to determine if the bargained-for-exchange was so 
unjust as to necessitate invocation of one of any number of 
contractual doctrines to void, or make voidable, such Get settlement 
contracts. 
52. WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 29, at xii ("Indeed, often agunot are abused women as 
are their children."). 
53. See supra Part II.B. 
54. In one case, a man paid a recalcitrant husband $250,000 so that his granddaughter 
would receive a Get. Lucette Lagnado, Of Human Bondage, in WOMEN IN CHAINS, 
supra note 29, at 6. 
55. See Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (App. Div. 1987) (detailing a situation where 
the husband demanded all of the couple's jointly-held securities). 
56. See Horsburgh, supra note 47, at 174. 
57. Barbara J. Redman, Jewish Divorce: What Can Be Done in Secular Courts to Aid the 
Jewish Woman?, 19 GA. L. REv. 389, 392 (1985) ("The wife in this situation has two 
choices: she can refuse to impoverish herself and suffer the consequences of being an 
adulteress and raising bastards, or she can agree to an inequitable divorce contract 
which deprives her of all fair return from her contribution to the marriage and severely 
disadvantages her economically."). 
58. BROYDE, ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH LAW, supra note 6, at 30. See also Burns v. 
Burns, 538 A.2d 438, 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) ("This so-called 'offer' is 
akin to extortion."). 
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One fmal note is in order. It should be made clear from the outset 
that this author does not posit that all contracts made in the course of 
Orthodox separations or divorces are void or voidable. This author is 
well aware that hard bargaining is a natural part of the separation or 
divorce process,59 and there is no reason to think that such hard 
bargaining is not also present in Jewish divorces. This Comment 
only wishes to elucidate scenarios where a husband is willing to 
desert his wife and leave her as an Agunah if she refuses to agree to a 
contract in which both the respective bargaining positions and terms 
of the contract are grossly unfair. 
III. CLEARING THE CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLE 
Before discussing the contractual doctrines that may allow courts to 
refuse the enforcement of Get settlement contracts, it must be first 
clearly established that secular courts are fit to adjudicate such 
disputes. While disputes involving civil divorces and secular 
contracts are clearly properly heard in civil courts, "[a] court ... will 
refuse to decide an essentially religious issue even if the issue is 
otherwise properly before the court, and even if it is asked to decide 
it. "60 One could argue that Get settlement contracts should not be 
within a secular court's purview, running afoul of the First 
Amendment;61 after al~ "[a] wife who does not receive a get is 
harmed only because she and others have a religious and cultural 
sense that the get is important."62 However, after examining other 
scenarios implicating religious concerns that courts have held to be 
within their purview, it becomes apparent to this author that secular 
courts are not constitutionally barred from adjudicating Get 
settlement contract disputes. 
59. See Robert Dinerstein et a!., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client 
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REv. 755, 795 (2004) 
("Yet it has to be recognized that divorce negotiations are inevitably focused on 
custody and money, and it is hard to imagine negotiations that do not involve pressure 
on each of these fronts .... "). 
60. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 n.15 ( 1983). 
61. The pertinent part of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
62. Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law, supra note 19, at 814 (emphasis added). 
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A. "Religious Duress" 
The Superior Court of New Jersey, in Smith v. Kelly,63 discussed 
the phenomenon of "religious duress."64 There, a priest defmed 
religious duress as "'a state of mind whereby a person feels internally 
compelled to do or not do something because of a fear induced by a 
religious power and/or authority [i.e. the Church hierarchy]. '"65 The 
priest further testified that, because of religious duress, a plaintiff 
would be afraid of taking action against the Church or its members, 
in fear of excommunication or damnation. 66 While the court 
ultimately held that the priest's statements "constitute[ d] an 
impermissible net opinion,"67 the court did not bar consideration of 
such a doctrine on constitutional grounds. 68 Similarly, Agunot suffer 
from their own type of religious duress. That is, whereas the 
religious authority compelling Catholics to act or not to act is the 
Church, Agunot have their own religious authority compelling them 
to enter into Get settlement contracts: Jewish law. Agunot ostensibly 
understand the realities of their situation: they are required to obtain a 
Get before dating or seeing other men. As such, they often feel 
compelled to give in to the recalcitrant husband's demands, as unfair 
as the terms may be. Thus, it is clear that at least some courts do not 
bar, on constitutional grounds, giving recognition to the realities that 
religion imposes upon its followers, to determine if such realities 
63. 778 A.2d 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
64. /d. at 1172. For more on religious duress and Catholicism, see Thomas P. Doyle & 
Stephen C. Rubino, Catholic Clergy Sexual Abuse Meets the Civil Law, 31 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 549, 591-92 (2004); Thomas P. Doyle, Roman Catholic Clericalism, 
Religious Duress, and Clergy Sexual Abuse, 51 PASTORAL PSYCHOL. 189, 218-19 
(2003). 
65. Smith, 778 A.2d at 1172. 
66. /d. 
67. /d. 
68. /d. at 1172-73. There is, however, a line of cases that rejects the recognition of the 
doctrine of religious duress. See, e.g., Doe v. Holy See, 793 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (App. 
Div. 2005); Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 
662 (App. Div. 2000). However, these cases are distinguishable from this situation, in 
that they involved claims of malpractice, and would have required the courts to 
determine a duty owed by a cleric to a parishioner. See Langford, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 
662. The adjudication of Get settlement contracts does not involve a determination of 
a religious duty; it merely requires the courts to examine the realities of the Agunah 
predicament and determine if and how they affected the respective parties' bargaining 
powers at the formation of the agreement. 
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compelled an individual to act in a manner in which they otherwise 
would not have. 69 
B. Other Agunah and Get Cases Implicating the First Amendment 
Secular courts, in cases dealing with other Agunah- and Get-related 
issues, have both ordered the parties to submit to rabbinic arbitration 
and ordered recalcitrant husbands to give their respective wives 
Gets.70 A secular court's application of neutral contract law to Get 
settlement contracts falls well short of the level of religious 
entanglement involved when a secular court orders litigants to submit 
to rabbinic arbitration, or when they order husbands to deliver a 
religious document. If secular courts are willing to hold that such 
results are not violative of the First Amendment, a fortiori, they 
should similarly be willing to rule on the enforceability of Get 
settlement contracts. 
l. Prenuptial Agreements 
Both Orthodox and Conservative rabbis have sought to remedy the 
Agunah problem by having couples agree to submit to rabbinic 
arbitration in times of marital discord. 71 In the seminal case of 
Avitzur v. Avitzur,72 the Court of Appeals of New York enforced a 
prenuptial agreement to arbitrate all post-marital religious obligations 
to a Beth Din.73 Avitzur has often been described as a landmark 
decision, 74 for it ''was the first time any American court ordered a 
husband to submit to a bet[h} din based on obligations undertaken in 
69. See supra notes 63--68 and accompanying text. 
70. See discussion infra Parts III.B.l, III.B.2. 
71. See ISAAC KLEIN, A GUIDE TO JEWISH RELIGIOUS PRACTICE 393 (1979); Breitowitz, 
The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 361. 
72. 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983). 
73. !d. at 136-39. It should be noted that Avitzur dealt with a Conservative Ketubah that 
added a rabbinic arbitration clause. Such a clause like the one used in Avitzur would 
not be agreeable to an Orthodox Beth Din. See Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, 
supra note 2, at 361. For an example of a rabbinic arbitration agreement that would 
be agreeable to the Orthodox rabbinate, see BROYDE, ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH 
LAW, supra note 6, at 127-36; J. David Bleich, A Suggested Antenuptial Agreement: 
A Proposal in Wake of Avitzur, J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'Y, Spring 1984, at 34, 
38-39. 
74. See, e.g., Lisa Zornberg, Beyond the Constitution: Is the New York Get Legislation 
Good Law?, 15 PACE L. REv. 703, 725 (1995); Edward S. Nadel, New York's Get 
Laws: A Constitutional Analysis, 27 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 55, 66 (1993); 
Redman, supra note 57, at397. 
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the ketubah. "75 The Court of Appeals of New York held that ordering 
a couple to submit to such rabbinic arbitration, as required by a 
Ketubah,76 did not violate the First Amendment, for it is "nothing 
more than an agreement to refer the matter of a religious divorce to a 
nonjudicial forum."77 The court did take note of the fact that 
obligations stipulated by the Ketubah are "grounded in religious 
belief and practice,"78 but nevertheless held that a secular court could 
order the parties to submit to rabbinic arbitration, emphasizing that 
their decision was based "solely upon the application of neutral 
principles of contract law, without reference to any religious 
principle."79 Somehow, the court in Avitzur was able to rationalize 
judicial notice of the religious beliefs and practices set forth in a 
Ketubah and enforcement of provisions in that Ketubah by stating 
that they were merely applying "neutral" contract law.80 If the law 
considers such judicial notice of religious practices in a religious 
contract (the Ketubah) formed at a religious ceremony (a wedding) 
neutral, surely the same would apply to Get settlement contracts, 
which are secular in nature, and for which any religious implications 
are only incidental. 
2. Ordering the Husband to Grant His Wife a Get 
a. Express promises to give a Get 
While many argue that ordering parties to submit to rabbinic 
arbitration potentially runs afoul of the First Amendment,81 many 
75. Marc Feldman, Jewish Women and Secular Courts: Helping a Jewish Woman Obtain 
a Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 144 (1989-1990) (alteration in original). 
76. Literally "writing"; refers to a Jewish marriage document or contract. See Breitowitz, 
The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 343 n.ll9. 
77. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39. 
78. /d. at 139. 
79. /d. at 138. The Supreme Court has also commented on the "neutral principles" 
approach: 
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach 
are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible 
enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and 
polity. The method relies exclusively on objective, well-
established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers 
and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely 
from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and 
practice. 
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). 
80. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138. 
81. See BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CiVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW, supra note 13, at 99 ("[T]he 
court's reliance on the so-called 'neutral principles of contract law' proves too much. 
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jurisdictions have not shied away from going even further. A number 
of courts have gone so far as to enforce express promises or 
contracts, made by husbands, to grant their wives Gets. 82 That is, 
they are not merely ordering the parties to go to a non-judicial arbiter; 
rather, they are ordering husbands to undertake a religious action in 
granting their wives Jewish bills of divorce. 
For instance, the court in Koeppel v. KoeppeZS3 specifically 
enforced an agreement made by a separated couple whereby the 
couple would "execute any and all papers and documents required by 
and necessary to effectuate a dissolution of their marriage in 
accordance with the ecclesiastical laws of the Faith and Church of 
said parties."84 The court enforced that paragraph of the separation 
agreement and held that such enforcement did not violate the 
husband's freedom-of-religion rights under the Constitution: 
Complying with his agreement would not compel the 
defendant to practice any religion, not even the Jewish faith 
to which he still admits . . . . His appearance before the 
Rabbinate to answer questions and give evidence needed by 
them to make a decision is not a profession of faith. 
Specific performance herein would merely require the 
defendant to do what he voluntarily agreed to do.85 
Essentially, the court cleared the constitutional hurdle by implicitly 
stating that "the mere fact that a ceremony, procedure, or activity is 
governed by religious law does not preclude its civil enforcement by 
way of a simple contract. "86 
More than two decades later, in Waxstein v. Waxstein, 87 another 
New York court enforced a similar clause in a separation agreement 
Could not the same be said about an agreement to pray or observe the Sabbath and yet 
it is inconceivable that any court oflaw would compel a person to perform an 'act of 
Divine worship' merely because he promised to do so."). 
82. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85, 88-89, 91-92 and cases cited therein. 
However, many jurisdictions have held that their courts are constitutionally prohibited 
from specifically enforcing express promises to grant Gets. See Fleischer v. Fleischer, 
586 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787, 
788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Steinberg v. Steinberg, No. 44125, 1982 WL 2446 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1982); see also Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra 
note 2, at 339 n.90. 
83. 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
84. Jd. at 370. 
85. !d. at 373. However, after trial, the court ruled that the clause was too indefinite to be 
enforceable. Koeppel v. Koeppel, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694, 695-96 (App. Div. 1957). 
86. Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 340. 
87. 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1977). 
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requiring a husband to obtain and grant his wife a Get.88 Relying 
heavily on Koeppel, the court rejected the husband's contention that 
"the court may not enforce a contractual provision requiring a spouse 
to obtain a 'Get. "'89 However, the court did caution that it could riot 
specifically enforce the agreement "by means of imprisonment or the 
convening of a rabbinical tribunal."90 
While the majority of the Agunah litigation has taken place in New 
York and New Jersey, the most recent reported opinion in which a 
court has enforced an express promise to give a Get is out of 
Delaware. In the 1992 case of Scholl v. Scholl,91 the Family Court of 
Delaware dealt with a situation that was different from Koeppel and 
Waxstein, in that the husband did deliver a Get, as he was obligated 
to do pursuant to a separation agreement, from a Beth Din. 92 
However, the wife contended that the Get was insufficient, being that 
it was obtained from a Conservative Beth Din and, as such, it could 
be given no effect or religious significance by an Orthodox Beth 
Din.93 The court held that the husband did not meet his contractual 
obligations by supplying his wife with a Conservative Get,94 and, 
relying heavily on both Koeppel and W axstein, further held that it 
was not constitutionally barred from ordering specific performance.95 
b. Implied promises to give a Get 
Not only have some courts specifically enforced express promises 
or agreements to give Gets, others have gone even further yet to 
imply such agreements from the language of a Ketubah.96 The most 
88. !d. at 881. 
89. !d. at 880. 
90. !d. at 881. 
91. Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1992). 
92. !d. at 809. 
93. !d. A Conservative Get is not considered valid in an Orthodox Beth Din. See 
Alexandra Leichter, The Impact of Jewish Divorce Law on Family Law Litigation, 14 
DOMESTICREL. J. 0HI040, 41 n.l (2002). 
94. Scholl, 621 A.2d at 812 ("This language specifically requires Husband to cooperate 
with Wife in allowing her to obtain a GET. The facts of this case strongly suggest that 
Husband did everything but cooperate with his Wife. Husband went out on his own 
and obtained a conservative GET. . . . He did not ask Wife which type of GET she 
wanted .... "). 
95. !d. at 810-ll. 
96. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CiVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW, supra note 13, at 81-83; see a/so 
Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (enforcing a mahr, an Islamic 
marriage document, despite it being entered into as a part of a religious ceremony). 
But see Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a 
Ketubah is not an enforceable antenuptial agreement under which a husband can be 
ordered to obtain a Get for his wife). 
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obvious example of this is In re Marriage of Goldman.97 In 
Goldman, a couple was married in a Reconstructionise8 Jewish 
wedding. 99 During the course of the marriage, the wife became an 
Orthodox Jew, and upon the civil dissolution of the marriage, she 
wanted her husband to grant her a Get. 100 When he refused, the wife 
instituted a legal action, arguing that a Ketubah contains an implied 
stipulation that the husband grant the wife a Get upon dissolution of 
the marriage. 101 The Appellate Court of Illinois agreed with Mrs. 
Goldman, holding that in signing a marriage contract containing the 
words "be thou my wife according to the law of Moses and Israel,"102 
the parties intended to be governed by Orthodox Jewish law. 103 The 
court stated that requiring a husband to obtain and deliver a Get to his 
wife does not violate the Establishment Clause104 because the order 
had the secular purpose of enforcing a marriage contract, and to 
promote the settlement of a dispute. 105 Further, the court held that 
requiring a husband to so act did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause, 106 because the husband's dislike for Orthodox Judaism did 
not reach the level of a "religious belief," and because the husband 
was merely using his withholding power as a bargaining chip in the 
settlement process. 107 Thus, we see that courts are not only willing to 
give legal effect to express promises to give a Get, but some also give 
97. 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). However, Goldman was not the first case to 
infer, in the absence of an express agreement, agreements from a Ketubah. See 
Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (involving implied 
agreements from the Ketubah to grant wife a Get, but only in situations where Jewish 
law mandates divorce); Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) 
(involving an implied agreement from the Ketubah to submit to rabbinic arbitration 
and initiate Get proceedings); Stern v. Stern, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2810 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Aug. 7, 1979). For a criticism of the court's result in Goldman, see Breitowitz, 
The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 348-50. 
98. Followers of reconstructionist Judaism believe that "Jewish theism should be 
abandoned, and Judaism should be conceived as an evolving religious civilization." 
Reconstructionist, http://www.rnY.iewishlearning.com/ilg/Reconstructionist.htm (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2009). 
99. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1018. 
100. /d. at 1018-19. 
101. See id. at 1019. 
I 02. /d. A similar language is verbalized by husbands in a prescribed formula under the 
marriage canopy. See id. at I 0 18. 
103. See id. at 1021. 
104. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
105. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023. 
106. "[O]r prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CaNST. amend. I. 
107. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023-24. 
2009] Give and "Get?" 119 
such effect to a Ketubah as a binding contract, and infer such 
promises to give a Get by its language. 
Professor Breitowitz has detailed much of the above in his 1992 
article, published in the University of Maryland Law Review. 108 The 
purpose of reviewing the cases dealing with other Agunah- and Get-
related situations is not to repeat that which is already available to the 
legal community. Rather, this author elucidates these cases to 
establish the types of religious matters that secular courts have held 
to be within their purview, comparing such cases with our Get 
settlement scenario. To reiterate, courts have held that they are not 
constitutionally barred from enforcing an agreement to submit to 
rabbinic arbitration, 109 or from ordering a husband to grant his wife a 
Get. 110 Essentially, in these situations, secular courts force litigants to 
engage in religious activities, either in the form of going to a Beth 
Din or granting a wife a Get. While such decisions purport to pass 
constitutional muster, they have not gone without criticism from 
scholars, who argue that forcing individuals to engage in religious 
activities runs afoul of the Constitution.111 However, in looking at 
Get settlement contracts, secular courts do not force a husband to 
engage in the religious activities of submitting to rabbinic arbitration, 
or go so far as ordering a husband to grant his wife a Get. Rather, the 
court is merely looking at a secular contract and determining whether 
any contractual doctrines apply, such that the contract should be held 
to be void or voidable. This author posits that when the Supreme 
Court uses the phrase, "neutral principles of law,"112 it is more likely 
referring to courts applying contractual doctrines such as duress and 
unconscionability to secular contracts, than forcing litigants to submit 
to a Beth Din or grant a spouse a Get. Thus, if courts have deemed 
the latter to be constitutional, then a fortiori, secular courts should 
not be constitutionally barred from adjudicating the former: applying 
such principles to Get settlement contracts. 113 As Judge Wallach of 
the New York's Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First 
Department astutely put it: 
108. See Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 338-57. 
109. See supra Part ill.B.l. 
110. See supra Part ill.B.2. 
111. See supra note 82. 
112. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602--{)3 (1979). 
113. It is noteworthy that a number of cases dealing with Get settlement disputes do not 
undertake an extended discussion as to why the court is constitutionally permitted to 
adjudicate such disputes. This author opines that this is likely because this was not an 
issue at all for these courts. See supra Part m.B.2 and cases cited therein. 
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The appropriate division of religious and secular power has 
long been a matter of concern to civilized communities, at 
least since the ancient advice provided to the perplexed 
Judean taxpayers to render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's. During the 
next two millennia considerable blood has been spilled over 
which things belonged where .... [W]e hold that where 
either spouse has invoked the power of the state to effect a 
civil dissolution of a marriage, an oppressive misuse of the 
religious veto power by one of the spouses subjects the 
economic bargain which follows between them to review 
and potential revision. 114 
IV. THE NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY GET SETTLEMENT 
CONTRACT CASES 
Courts in New York and New Jersey have had a limited number of 
opportunities to rule on the enforceability of Get settlement contracts. 
To this author's knowledge, no court to date has declined to 
adjudicate the enforceability of Get settlement contracts on 
constitutional grounds. Illustrative is the case of Perl v. Perl, 115 
which involved a husband who conditioned his giving of a Get on a 
settlement agreement that "constituted nothing less than a total 
surrender of her rights." 116 The court cited favorably to Governor 
Mario Cuomo's memorandum approving the 1983 Get statute: 
This bill was overwhelmingly adopted by the State 
Legislature because it deals with a tragically unfair 
condition that is almost universally acknowledged. The 
requirement of a get is used by unscrupulous spouses who 
avail themselves of our civil courts and simultaneously use 
their denial of a get vindictively or as a form of economic 
coercion. 117 
Specifically, the court ruled that this settlement was "brought about 
by the husband's duress and destruction of her independent 
114. Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372,373 (App. Div. 1987). 
115. 512 N.Y.S.2d 372. 
116. !d. at 374. The settlement required the wife to deliver jointly-held securities, various 
cash payments, deed to one-half of the interest in the marital home, title to her 
automobile, and her engagement ring. !d. 
117. !d. at 375 (alteration omitted). 
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willpower," and as such, cancelled the settlement arrangement. 118 
Missing from the majority opinion was the slightest mention of the 
role of the courts in adjudicating disputes implicating the First 
Amendment. 119 While Judge Kupferman dissented in Per/, 120 it is 
clear that he was not aware of the realities that Agunot face. Judge 
Kupferman stated that while "[h]ere the husband may have been the 
beneficiary[; i]n other situations it could be the wife." 121 While there 
are undoubtedly divorce settlements that benefit the wife more than 
the husband, it is difficult to imagine such a situation when the 
litigation involves an Orthodox Jewish couple, for whom the husband 
has essentially all of the bargaining power. 122 
Five years later, New York was next afforded an opportunity to 
rule on the enforceability of a Get settlement contract, in Golding v. 
Golding. 123 In this case, a husband informed his wife that he would 
not be delivering her a Get until "she gave him everything that he 
wanted."124 The wife went on to sign a document she did not 
understand, written in Hebrew, that enumerated the husband's 
demands. 125 Instead of delivering the Get, the husband tendered 
further documentation for the wife to sign, again making clear to her 
that she would not receive a Get unless she did so. 126 The court noted 
that the husband exploited the power differential "so as to completely 
dominate a process which should have entailed honest negotiating," 
in holding that the "plaintiff did not freely and voluntarily enter into 
the subject agreement but was compelled to do so by her husband's 
invocation of his power to refuse to give her a Jewish divorce. " 127 
While the court noted that secular courts should not settle such 
disputes "in a manner requiring consideration of religious 
doctrine,"128 the court ultimately held that this dispute could "be 
decided solely upon the application of neutral principles of contract 
law, without reference to any religious principle." 129 
118. See id. at 374-77. 
119. See supra Part III.B.l. 
120. 512 N.Y.S.2d at 377 (Kupferman, J., dissenting). 
121. /d. 
122. See BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CiVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW, supra note 13, at 18-19. 
123. 581 N.Y.S.2d 4 (App. Div. 1992). 
124. /d. at 5. 
125. /d. 
126. /d. 
127. /d. at 6. 
128. /d. at 7. 
129. /d. (citing Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1983)). 
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In 1994, the Superior Court ofNew Jersey had its first opportunity 
to invalidate a Get settlement contract. 130 In Segal v. Segal, 131 the 
husband refused to give his wife a Get ''unless she conveyed [their 
home] property to him, waived any claim to child support or alimony, 
disclaimed any interest in all marital assets including [her husband]' s 
business, and in addition paid him $25,000."132 The court held that, 
because the wife was subjected to "extreme pressures," the Get 
settlement contract was secured by duress, and the deed conveying 
the house was invalid. 133 Again missing from the court's opinion was 
a mention of the court's role in adjudicating claims implicating the 
First Amendment. 134 
V. THE RESTATEMENT APPLIED 
While courts have not shied away from voiding Get settlement 
contracts, they have not examined them through the lens of the 
Restatement of Contracts.135 With many jurisdictions either formally 
adopting as law136 or seeking guidance from the Restatement of 
Contracts, 137 it is worthwhile to apply the sections pertaining to 
duress and unconscionability to a typical Get settlement contract 
scenano. 
A. Duress 
Section 17 5 of the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, regarding duress, provides that "[i]f a party's 
130. While New Jersey had previously dealt with a recalcitrant husband seeking to extort 
money from his spouse, the court in that case ordered the parties to submit to the 
jurisdiction of a Beth Din, without voiding or making voidable the contract. See 
Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438, 440-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). 
131. 650 A.2d 996 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
132. !d. at 997. 
133. !d. at 998. 
134. See id., 650 A.2d at 996. 
135. For instance, the court in Segal simply said: "[W]e are satisfied that the overwhelming 
evidence at trial ... compels the conclusion that Shirley's assent to the marital 
settlement agreement ... was secured by duress, and that the March 25, 1987 deed ... 
is invalid." Jd at 1000. 
136. See, e.g., Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 782 (Wash. 2005) (Washington; 
unconscionability); Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 920-22 (Utah 1993) (Utah; 
duress). The Virgin Islands has adopted the Restatement of Contracts in its entirety. 
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (2005); Black v. Powers, 628 S.E.2d 546, 557 (Va. Ct. App. 
2006). 
137. See, e.g., Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 174-75 (D. 
D.C. 2007) (District ofthe District ofColumbia; duress); Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 
863 N.E.2d 503, 511 (Mass. 2007) (Massachusetts; duress); Hoover Slovacek LLP v. 
Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557, 565 {Tex. 2006) (Texas; unconscionability). 
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manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other 
party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is 
voidable by the victim."138 The following section goes on to explain 
that: 
(1) A threat is improper if (a) what is threatened is a crime 
or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime or a tort if it 
resulted in obtaining property, (b) what is threatened is a 
criminal prosecution, (c) what is threatened is the use of 
civil process and the threat is made in bad faith, or (d) the 
threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
under a contract with the recipient. (2) A threat is improper 
if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and (a) the 
threatened act would harm the recipient and would not 
significantly benefit the party making the threat, (b) the 
effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of 
assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by 
the party making the threat, or (c) what is threatened is 
otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends. 139 
Thus, to determine whether a contract is voidable by the victim, 
one's analysis must first determine whether the threat was 
"improper"; and, if so, whether that threat left the victim with no 
"reasonable alternative. " 140 
1. Improper Threat 
a. Crime or tort 
In a typical Get settlement contract scenario, as in the New York 
and New Jersey cases, 141 the husband is essentially threatening to 
leave his wife in a state whereby she may be compromised from an 
economic or mental-health standpoint, and she may never live with, 
cohabitate with, or even date another man. 142 The first inquiry under 
§ 175 ofthe Restatement is whether threatening to leave a woman as 
an Agunah, with all of the aforementioned symptoms, constitutes a 
crime or a tort. 143 
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 175(1) (1981). 
139. /d. § 176. 
140. /d. § 175(1). 
141. See supra Part IV and cases cited therein. 
142. See supra Part II. B. 
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175( 1) ( 1981 ). 
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In fact, many authors have argued that Agunot can recover from 
their recalcitrant husbands under the widely-accepted144 tort of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED). 145 The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[ o ]ne who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such 
bodily harm."146 The Restatement's comments point out that the 
behavior must go beyond "mere insults, indignities, threats, 
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities," by emphasizing 
that such behavior must be so extreme in degree, "as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community," such that an average 
member of the community would scream out, "'[o]utrageous!"'147 
Professor Breitowitz acknowledges that "in some cases of [A]gunah, 
[this] tort remedy may be appropriate," being that it should be easy to 
prove that a husband intentionally inflicts emotional distress, and 
because "in some cases, if not most, the anxiety, pain, and 
humiliation will be considerable."148 
An injured party need not prove bodily harm to recover under 
IIED,149 and the Restatement illustrates an example of a non-bodily 
harm situation that would suffice for liED recovery: 
A, a police officer, arrests B on a criminal charge. In order 
to extort a confession, A falsely tells B that her child has 
been injured in an accident and is dying in a hospital, and 
that she cannot be released to go to the hospital until she 
144. See Jarod S. Gonzalez, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of 
Common Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REv. 115, 117 n.13, 122 
n.35 (2007) (listing jurisdictions adopting the Restatement's approach to liED). 
However, it has been argued that "since divorce settlements are usually acrimonious, 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not apply. Therefore, any 
behavior, no matter how extreme, will be unaccountable in tort liability." Debbie Eis 
Sreter, Nothing to Lose But Their Chains: A Survey of the Aguna Problem in 
American Law, 28 J. FAM. L. 703, 713 (1989-1990). 
145. See generally A. Yehuda Warburg, Spousal Emotional Stress: Proposed Relief for the 
Modern-Day Agunah, J. HALACHA & CoNTEMP. Soc'Y, Spring 2008 (discussing 
potential recovery under emotional distress in Beth Dins). 
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
147. !d.§ 46 cmt. d. 
148. Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 399. However, Professor 
Breitowitz does note that it may be more difficult for an Agunah to recover for liED 
where the husband is merely using his recalcitrance as an economic bargaining chip, 
and not to intentionally inflict distress. !d. at 399-400. 
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. k ( 1965). 
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confesses. B suffers severe emotional distress but no 
physical consequences. A is subject to liability to B. 150 
125 
A Get settlement contract scenario is highly analogous. The 
husband is effectively telling his wife that, unless she signs a Get 
settlement contract, she will lead a life devoid of emotional 
attachment, and should she choose to have children with another 
man, they will forever be recognized in society as bastards. That is, 
similar to Illustration 19, the liable party is telling a parent that his or 
her child is afflicted with a serious condition; in a Get settlement 
contract scenario, the husband is telling the wife that should she not 
assent to the settlement, any future children will be afflicted with a 
serious spiritual condition (the status of Mamzerim). While it can be 
argued that Illustration 19.presents a more compelling case because it 
involves a parent thinking that his or her child's death is impending, 
the Agunah situation "should be sufficient to demonstrate the 
genuineness of her claim of mental suffering."151 
Another author, in arguing that Agunot should be able to recover 
under liED, points out that "[t]he focus is not upon any particular 
kind of conduct, but rather on the actor's deviation from accepted 
societal behavior .... "152 Despite a wide range in the reported 
number of Agunot in America, 153 any estimate of the prevalence of 
the Agunah problem is miniscule when compared with the total 
incidence of Jewish divorce. 154 Both the infrequency of the Agunah 
predicament and the realities of leaving one's wife a lonely celibate 
surely lead to the conclusion that a husband's refusal to grant a Get 
must be considered a deviation from accepted behavior--one that 
would cause an average member of society to exclaim, 
"'[ o ]utrageous! "'155 
If the aforementioned authors are correct in asserting that leaving 
one's wife an Agunah, or threatening to do so in the absence of a Get 
150. !d. § 46 cmt. k, illus. 19. 
151. David M. Cobin, Jewish Divorce and the Recalcitrant Husband-Refusal to Give a Get 
as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 405, 420 (1986). 
Cobin argues that the remedy should not be monetary damages; rather, the court 
should order the parties to submit to rabbinic arbitration. See id. at 421-29. See also 
Redman, supra note 57, at 416. 
152. Cobin, supra note 151, at 417. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29. 
154. See WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 29, at xiii (stating that according to some Orthodox 
rabbis, "about 5 percent of all Orthodox marriages end in the agunah stage."). 
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 cmt. d (1965). 
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settlement contract, 156 is an actionable tort under liED, 157 then such a 
threat is considered an improper one under the Restatement. Thus, 
assuming the threat left the wife with no "reasonable altemative,"158 a 
Get settlement contract induced by a would-be recalcitrant husband 
should be deemed voidable by the court. 
Furthermore, numerous authors have used the word "extortion" 
when referring to the actions of recalcitrant husbands seeking to 
obtain a windfall settlement.159 If these authors are correct in 
asserting that such behavior meets criteria for the criminal offense of 
extortion, then the threat to leave one's wife as an Agunah must 
further be considered improper under the Restatement. 160 
According to the Model Penal Code, "[a] person is guilty of theft 
[or extortion] if he purposely obtains property of another by 
threatening to . . . (7) inflict any other harm which would not benefit 
the actor."161 In our situation, a husband who chooses to withhold a 
Get from his wife and leave her as an Agunah gains no benefit from 
such actions. In addition to exposing himself to potential civil 
liability for the tort of IIED,162 the recalcitrant husband is not 
allowed, according to Jewish law prohibiting polygamy, to 
remarry. 163 Furthermore, the husband may be ostracized from the 
Jewish community and be subjected to a host of social pressures; he 
may even be prohibited from praying in local synagogues. 164 Thus, 
aside from remaining married to his wife and any sadistic pleasure a 
recalcitrant husband feels by leaving his wife an Agunah, such 
horrible actions do "not benefit the actor."165 As such, at least in 
some jurisdictions, threatening to withhold a Get may expose a 
husband to criminal liability sufficient to trigger an improper threat, 
156. Redman, supra note 57, at 417 ("The wife should sue the husband for intentional 
infliction of emotional harm if he refuses to grant a get or attempts to extort large 
financial concessions in exchange for one.") (emphasis added). 
157. But see Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372,376 (App. Div. 1987) (affirming dismissal of a 
wife's liED claim against her would-be recalcitrant husband). 
158. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 175 (1981). 
159. See supra note _58 and accompanying text. 
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 176(l)(a) (1981). 
161. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 223.4 (1962). The language of subsection 7 is substantially 
mimicked in numerous jurisdictions' theft or extortion statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.41.520(7) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-119(5)(1) (West 
2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 570.010(3)(g) (West 1999); 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 
3923(a)(7) (West 1999). 
162. See supra notes 139-151 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
164. E-mail from Dovid Gottlieb, Rabbi, Congregation Shomrei Emunah, Baltimore, Md., 
to author (Feb. 11, 2009, 00:15 ES1) (on file with author). 
165. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 223.4 (1962). 
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whereby a contract induced by the threat can be held voidable 
pursuant to the Restatement. 166 
b. Breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
The frrst issue regarding whether subsection ( 1 )(d) of Restatement 
§ 176 applies is whether, by agreeing to the terms of a Ketubah, the 
parties to a Jewish marriage are contractually bound to one another. 167 
While a full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, it is clear from the Goldman line of cases that at least 
some courts are willing to conclude that a Ketubah is a binding 
contract between husband and wife. 168 
A person breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing when, for 
example, "a threat of non-performance [is] made for some purpose 
unrelated to the contract, such as to induce the recipient to make an 
entirely separate contract."169 To elucidate this, Illustration 9 
provides: 
A contracts to excavate a cellar for B at a stated price. A 
begins the excavation and then threatens not to finish it 
unless B makes a separate contract to excavate the cellar of 
another building. B, having no reasonable alternative, is 
induced by A's threat to make the contract. A's threat is a 
breach of his duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the 
proposed contract is voidable by B. 170 
This type of situation is highly analogous to a Get settlement 
contract scenario. Applying our situation, the illustration could easily 
read: Husband and Wife contract to marry according to the 
stipulations found in a Ketubah. Husband and Wife are married for a 
period of time, when Husband threatens not to abide by the terms of 
the Ketubah [refusing to divorce Wife, leaving her an Agunah] unless 
Husband and Wife make a separate contract to give Husband a 
windfall in the separation proceedings. Wife, having no reasonable 
166. See Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438, 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) ("This so-
called 'offer' is akin to extortion."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 
(1981). 
167. That is, it is untenable to assume that a court will imply legal obligations from an 
agreement unless the agreement itself was a legally enforceable contract. See In re 
Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1023 (lll. App. Ct. 1990). 
168. /d. at 1021 ("[T]he ketubah on its face contains language of consideration and mutual 
promises."). See also Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 347 
n.153. 
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 176 cmt. e (1981). 
170. /d. § 176 cmt. e, illus. 9. 
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alternative, is induced by Husband's threat to make the contract. 
Husband's threat is a breach of his duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, and the proposed contract is voidable by Wife. 171 
In order for the parallel scenario to be accurate, we must be of the 
opinion that refusing to divorce a woman, thereby leaving her an 
Agunah, is a breach of the Ketubah agreement. Such an opinion is 
not unequivocally held by all, 172 but it is clear that at least some 
courts have concluded that refusing to give a wife a Get is a breach of 
the Ketubah 's requirement to be bound by the "laws of Moses and 
lsrael."173 In jurisdictions so holding, just as the scenario described 
by Illustration 9 is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
forcing a woman to agree to the Get settlement contract is a breach of 
the husband's duty of good faith and fair dealing under the Ketubah 
contract. In such a situation, § 176(1)(d) would deem a husband's 
threat to leave his wife an Agunah as an improper one, whereby the 
Get settlement agreement would become voidable at the wife's 
option. 
2. ''No Reasonable Alternative" 
Assuming a threat is improper under § 176, the inquiry then shifts 
to whether, as a result of the improper threat, the victim has "no 
reasonable alternative."174 If the language of the Restatement was 
merely "no alternative," it could then be argued that a woman faced 
with a Get settlement contract would not meet the requirements for 
duress; after all, a woman does have two other choices: to remain a 
lonely celibate, or to leave the Orthodox way of life. 175 However, in 
adding a reasonableness requirement, the Restatement seemingly 
understood that individuals posed with a threat may have alternatives, 
albeit ones falling short of being "reasonable." For instance, the 
Restatement gives an example of the "no reasonable alternative" 
requirement: 
171. See id. 
172. See, e.g., Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
agreement to comply with the "'laws of Moses and Israel'" is too vague to describe "a 
mutual understanding that husband would secure a Jewish divorce"); Breitowitz, The 
Plight of the Agunah, supra note 2, at 348-50. 
173. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1021 (lll. App. Ct. 1990); 
Bums v. Burns, 538 A.2d 438, 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987); Minkin v. Minkin, 
434 A.2d 665, 665-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981). 
174. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 175(1) (1981). 
175. See supra Part II. B. 
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A, who has contracted to sell goods to B, makes an 
improper threat to refuse to deliver the goods to B unless B 
modifies the contract to increase the price. B attempts to 
buy substitute goods elsewhere but is unable to do so. 
Being in urgent need of the goods, he makes the 
modification ... B has no reasonable alternative, A's threat 
amounts to duress, and the modification is voidable by B.176 
129 
Just as B' s alternatives to agreeing to the subsequent contract leave 
him paying a higher price for his goods, an Agunah 's alternatives to 
agreeing to a Get settlement contract leave her paying a higher price: 
her mental health. As discussed previously, a woman threatened with 
a Get settlement contract is presented with a "Morton's Fork": 177 
choose to leave the Orthodox way of life, potentially causing extreme 
amounts of cognitive dissonance; or choose to remain true to the 
Orthodox way oflife by leading a lonely celibate life sure to deprive 
the wife of self-esteem and confidence. 178 Thus, while a woman 
technically has alternatives, it cannot be said that potentially 
subjecting oneself to long-term mental health detriments is any sort 
of reasonable alternative. As such, a woman presented with a Get 
settlement contract passes the second prong of the Restatement 
duress inquiry because she lacks a reasonable alternative to her assent 
to the Get settlement contract. 
The essence of the inequities of a Get settlement contract scenario, 
as it relates to the doctrine of duress, is embodied in a statement made 
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1900: 
The making of a contract requires the free exercise of the 
will power of the contracting parties, and the free meeting 
and blending of their minds. In the absence of that, the 
essential of a contract is wanting; and if such absence be 
produced by the wrongful conduct of one party to the 
transaction, or conduct for which he is responsible, whereby 
the other party, for the time being, through fear, is bereft of 
his free will power, for the purpose of obtaining the 
contract, and it is thereby obtained, such contract may be 
avoided on the ground of duress. 179 
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. b (internal citations omitted). 
177. See supra note 33. 
178. See supra Part II.B and text accompanying notes 34-46. 
179. Galusha v. Sherman, 81 N.W. 495, 500 (Wis. 1900). 
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In the formation of a Get settlement contract, the wife lacks the free 
exercise of will power. There is no meeting or blending of the minds. 
It is an understatement to term the husband's conduct, which 
frightens a woman into assent, as "wrongful." As such, for the 
reasons explained, Get settlement contracts may be held voidable on 
the grounds of duress. 
B. Unconscionability 
Every one of the aforementioned New York and New Jersey cases 
invalidating Get settlement agreements did so on the grounds of 
duress. 180 However, this author believes a strong argument can also 
be made to void Get settlement contracts on the grounds of 
unconscionability. Section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts provides: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time 
the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 181 
Whether or not a term of a contract is unconscionable is not 
determined in a sterile setting; rather, it must be considered "in the 
light of its setting, puwose and effect." 182 For instance, in In re 
Marriage of Baltins/ 83 the court invalidated a divorce settlement 
agreement which left the husband with assets totaling $507,700, 
whereas the wife received assets totaling $63,000. 184 In reality, 
however, the settlement was worth much more to the wife, albeit not 
from a fmancial standpoint. That is, the husband threatened to avoid 
paying his wife or their creditors by declaring bankruptcy. 185 
Furthermore, the husband threatened that, if the wife did not sign the 
180. See, e.g., Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374, 376 (App. Div. 1987) ("[T]he 
distribution of the marital property before the referee constituted nothing less than a 
total surrender of her rights brought about by the husband's duress and destruction of 
her independent will power.") (emphasis added). 
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 ( 1981 ). 
182. /d. § 208 cmt. a. 
183. 260 Cal Rptr. 403,406 (Ct. App. 1989) 
184. !d. at 408. See also Williams v. Williams, 306 Md. 332, 508 A.2d 985 (1986) (setting 
aside, on grounds of unconscionability, a divorce settlement agreement which left one 
spouse with approximately $131,000 in property, and the other merely $1,100 in 
property). 
185. Baltins, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 408. 
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settlement agreement, he would have no contact with their child. 186 
Thus, while the four comers of the settlement agreement left her with 
assets totaling only $63,000, the settlement was worth much more to 
her when considering the avoidance of the negative consequences of 
the husbands threats. Nevertheless, the court held that the husband 
"intentionally used coercion to induce Wife's consent to an 
unconscionable contract and a default judgment dissolving the 
marriage."187 Therefore, it appears that in considering whether a 
contract is unconscionable, at least some courts merely look to the 
four comers of the contract without accounting for any non-monetary 
benefits a party to the contract receives. 
When looking at the four comers of a Get settlement contract, the 
terms are most often at least as unequal as those in Baltins. 188 
Gleaning facts from published cases, a Get settlement scenario can 
involve the husband receiving tens-of-thousands of dollars, 189 other 
marital assets, 190 or custody of the couple's children. 191 Compare this 
with what the wife receives: a divorce. The wife has just paid for a 
divorce-the same, albeit civil, divorce that she is free and 
empowered to obtain in a secular court; the same divorce that, were 
she not an Orthodox Jew, would allow her to cohabitate with other 
men; and the same divorce that the overwhelming majority of women 
in the United States obtain with little trouble192-by "spending" 
exorbitant amounts of money, marital assets, and even the custody of 
her own children. While it is undeniable that this divorce is quite 
valuable to her when considering the alternative of being left as an 
Agunah, courts taking the Baltins approach to unconscionability193 
would render this fact immaterial. That is, when looking solely to the 
four comers of the Get settlement contract and weighing what the 
husband receives against what the wife receives, the disparity should 
186. !d. at 409. 
187. !d. at 415 (citations omitted). 
188. See id. at 408-10. 
189. See Perl v. Perl, 512 N.Y.2d 372, 374 (App. Div. 1987). 
190. See id. at 374. 
191. See Horsburgh, supra note 47, at 174. 
192. See Angela Mae Kupenda, Law, Life, and Literature: A Critical Reflection of Life and 
Literature to Illuminate How Laws of Domestic Violence, Race, and Class Bind Black 
Women Based on Alice Walker's Book The Third Life of Grange Copeland, 42 How. 
L.J. I, 9 (1998) ("[P]olls show that many Americans believe that presently divorce is 
too easily obtained."); Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of 
Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REv. 345, 420 (1997) ("In 
fact, ... divorce is easily obtained and common .... "). 
193. See In reMarriage ofBaltins, 260 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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be enough for a court to fmd the contract void by means of 
unconscionability. 
Aside from the specific terms of a contract suffering from 
unconscionability, a court may also deem the entire bargain 
unconscionable due to "[w]eaknesses in the bargaining process."194 
However, in forming a Get settlement contract, the wife does not 
suffer from a mere ''weakness" in bargaining power; she has no such 
power at all. The husband has the only thing which she desires-a 
Get-and she must accede to whatever the husband requests to obtain 
it. 195 Because a woman so situated ostensibly wants neither to leave 
the Orthodox way of life nor live the rest of her life as a lonely 
celibate, she will agree to the terms of a Get settlement contract, 
regardless of how decimated it will leave her. In effect, for a woman 
wishing to maintain her Orthodox lifestyle, the choice to agree to a 
Get settlement contract is really no choice at all. 
The Restatement foresees such a functional equivalent of a lack of 
choice by noting that "gross inequality ofbargaining power, together 
with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm 
indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or 
compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful 
choice, [or] no real alternative."196 In a Get settlement contract 
scenario, there is a gross inequality of bargaining power. The terms 
of such contracts are unreasonably favorable to the stronger party-
the husband. Almost prophetically, the Restatement predicts the end 
result for women in such a situation: no meaningful choice and no 
real alternative. 197 
C. Relief in Maryland: Unenforceability as Against Public Policy 
After Aleem v. Aleem198 
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland leaves open 
the possibility of unenforceability of Get settlement contracts by 
another contractual doctrine: void as against public policy. 199 In 
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 208 cmt. d (1981). However, a "bargain is 
not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position 
.... " !d. 
195. In fact, in Golding, the wife had to sign, not one, but three sets of documents before 
the husband granted a Get. Golding v. Golding, 581 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (App. Div. 1992). 
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 208 cmt. d. 
197. See id. 
198 404 Md. 404, 94 7 A.2d 489 (2008). 
199. See id. § 178 ("A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds 
of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its 
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Aleem v. Aleem/00 a divorcing wife sought to have her husband's 
pension declared "marital property," whereby she would be entitled 
to her half of the pension under Maryland law. 201 After the wife filed 
for divorce, the husband went to the Pakistan Embassy and 
performed a ceremony known as a Talaq. 202 A Talaq involves the 
husband saying "I divorce thee" three times, at which point the 
marriage is terminated.203 However, only "a husband has a virtual 
automatic right to talaq, ... but the wife only has a right to talaq if it 
is in the written marriage agreement or if he otherwise delegates that 
right to her."204 In this case, neither the Talaq nor the marriage 
contract awarded the wife any of the marital property.205 After 
establishing that the Maryland Legislature has recognized a public 
policy of equitably dividing the property interests of spouses/06 the 
Court of Appeals held that: 
the enforceability of a foreign talaq divorce provision, such 
as that presented here, in the courts ofMaryland, where only 
the male, i.e., husband, has an independent right to utilize 
talaq and the wife may utilize it only with the husband's 
permiSSion, is contrary to Maryland's constitutional 
provisions and thus is contrary to the "public policy" of 
Maryland. 207 
Thus, we see that the court in Aleem did not balk at refusing to 
enforce a Talaq, a type of contract which only the husband has an 
independent right to utilize. 
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the 
enforcement of such terms."). 
200. 404 Md. 404, 94 7 A.2d 489. 
201. /d. at411-12,947 A.2dat494. 
202. See id. at 406, 947 A.2d at 490. See generally Katayoun Alidadi, The Western 
Judicial Answer to Islamic Talaq; Peeking Through the Gate of Conflict of Laws, 5 
UCLA J. IsLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1 (2005) (discussing cases in which American courts 
did not recognize transnational divorces performed at embassies). 
203. See Aleem, 404 Md. at 406 n.1, 947 A.2d at 490 n.l. See generally Nehaluddin 
Ahmad, A Critical Appraisal of "Triple Divorce" in Islamic Law, 23 INT'L J.L. PoL'Y 
& F AM. 53 (2009). 
204. Aleem, 404 Md. at 406 n.1, 94 7 A.2d at 490 n.1. 
205. See id. at 407, 947 A.2d at 491. 
206. /d. at 421-22, 947 A.2d at 499-500 ("The Maryland Legislature declared Maryland's 
public policy in regard to property acquired during a marriage, stating in the preamble 
to Chapter 794 of the Acts of 1978, that 'the property interests of the spouses should 
be adjusted fairly and equitably."'). 
207. /d. at 422-23, 947 A.2d at 500-01. 
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Similarly, only a Jewish husband has the ability to effectuate a Get 
settlement contract. While there is no religious law mandating this 
gender inequity as there is with a Talaq, it is through a combination 
of the realities Agunot face208 and the recalcitrance of a Jewish 
husband that only the husband is in a position to offer a Get 
settlement contract. Of course, the result of a Get settlement contract 
is the same public policy ill that the Court of Appeals dealt with in 
Aleem: an unequal distribution of the marital property and assets. 209 
Just as the Court of Appeals found that a contract which only the 
husband has the independent right to effectuate, and which leads to 
an unequal separation of marital assets, is unenforceable as against 
Maryland public policy, they could and should similarly fmd that Get 
settlement contracts, suffering from the same lethal ingredients, are 
likewise unenforceable as against the public policy of the State of 
Maryland. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The rabbis teach that whoever is able to allow one Agunah to 
remarry, it is as if he or she has repaired a ruin in Jerusalem. 210 
Because attempting to aid Agunot is considered such a great deed, it 
is no surprise that legal scholars have authored a plethora of articles 
seeking to use the secular court system as a measure to supply aid to 
these plighted women.211 However, the issue has not received due 
attention within the Jewish community as a whole, likely stemming 
from a general sense of embarrassment over the issue.212 After fully 
understanding the plight Agunot face, 213 it becomes clear that it is 
incumbent upon all members of society-religious and otherwise-to 
take any and all measures to potentially ease their suffering. 
Contract law has long recognized that "[w]ords are not the only 
medium of expression."214 One need not speak with a rabbi or with 
an Agunah herself to comprehend the atrocities such women face. A 
Get settlement contract alone demonstrates such atrocities. Husband 
receives tens-of-thousands of dollars,215 other marital assets/16 and 
208. See generally supra Part II. B. 
209. See Aleem, 404 Md. at 421-22, 94 7 A.2d at 500. 
210. 0VADIAHHADAYAH, TESHUVOTYASKILAVDI2:E.H. 5 (1931). 
211. A search of legal journals on Westlaw for the word "agunah" returns 106 separate 
documents. 
212. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 1. 
213. See supra Part II. B. 
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custody of the couple's children.217 Wife receives a divorce-the 
same divorce that the overwhelming majority of women obtain with 
ease. So why would one agree to such an unfair contract? 
Essentially, a woman in this situation has a gun to her head. 
However, it is not her physical life she stands to lose if the trigger is 
pulled; it is her emotional life that will end from the anguish of living 
as an Agunah.218 Contract law has established that if a party enters a 
contract because he has a gun to his head, "the 'choice' to enter into 
the contract is not free and the contract is void."219 For women 
wishing to maintain an Orthodox lifestyle, the choice to enter into the 
Get settlement contract is similarly no choice at all. 
"[I]t was possible for five hundred years during the Geonic period 
to make significant gains in parity and protection for women, so it 
seems logical that now . . . the adoption of similarly reasoned 
solutions might be possible.'mo However, due to a general attitude 
that is opposed to change, such solutions are unlikely to come from 
the rabbinate. As such, it is important for those who understand the 
secular legal system to use its resources to help in any way possible. 
Get settlement contracts are the inevitable consequence of the 
Agunah predicament. While authors have suggested that voiding Get 
settlement contracts may cause husbands to "refuse to act in the 
absence of a guarantee that the concessions will not be overturned by 
a court later,"221 this author believes that many men will try to exploit 
their wives with such contracts if given the opportunity, but such men 
are not sadistic enough to withhold a Get if such contracts are held to 
be unenforceable. As such, secular courts should not shy away from 
refusing to enforce Get settlement contracts on the grounds of duress, 
unconscionability, or as against public policy. In their eyes, they will 
merely be applying doctrines of contract law to a given scenario; 
however, in the eyes of the rabbis, they will be saving the ruins of 
Jerusalem. 222 
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